DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY?
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES,
INTERNATIONAL AID AND CIVIL SOCIETY

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Abstract

This research report investigates the contours and content of an emerging paradigm for international aid premised on poverty reduction as part of a global security strategy informed by counter terrorism measures (CTMs) allied to ‘rebuilding’ failed or fragile states. Development cooperation as the ‘first line of defence’ against insecurity is examined in relation to the supposed causes and political labelling of terrorism and violent conflict. The new ‘development for security’ framework is then explored in three dimensions. First, security geography is investigated by establishing an expanded metric for allocating aid. Here measures of development and indicators of the quality of statehood provide eight categories of criteria to identify priority countries for aid investment. A complexity-based perspective of state-society relations is employed to ascertain what contributions civil society could make to realising security-related objectives of improving statehood, specifically in attaining a robust democracy. This analysis challenges the appropriateness and efficacy of the prevailing harmony or partnership model of development. Implications of a security-driven aid framework for civil society are explored in two areas. First, attention is directed at critical dimensions, demands and problems of technical compliance with CTMs faced by nongovernmental development organisations (NGDOs). Second, evolution in the political-economy of NGDOs and issues of identity, strategy and programming in a development for security scenario are explored. The extensive analysis is summarised in four propositions informing NGDO prospects. This broad approach is intended to foster critical awareness and reflection on what a development for security era might imply. Further, it provides an analytic foundation for necessary research on the interplay between civil society and aid as an instrument within an international security agenda.
1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorist strikes in the US, Europe, Africa, Asia and elsewhere have ended many innocent lives and continue to do so. Consequently, governments have taken steps to prevent terrorism in both the short and long term. With this goal in mind, United Nations Resolution 1373 of 2001 called on all members to apply themselves to combating terror within their areas of jurisdiction. In some countries – the US, the UK and Australia for example - rapid responses can be seen in the form of new counter-terrorism legislation. But legislation is only one armament in the repertoire of preventive responses. This paper traces the way in which international development cooperation is being aligned with a counter terrorism and security agenda and what this might mean for civil society.

A starting point for this paper is that the only future certainty is uncertainty. The complex forces that feed insecurity, provoke terrorists and foster conflict are unlikely to decrease in the short to medium term of ten to fifteen years. This position draws on an array of studies that - often under a rubric of globalisation analysis, scenario building (Swartz, 1991) and other approaches to appraising trends and discontinuities - point towards futures characterised by technological and economic advance allied to growing human migrations, energy predicaments, uncertainty, anxiety, accelerating inequality, anarchy and worse (e.g., Kaplan, 2000; Kunstler, 2005). These outcomes are attributed to both deeply systemic and more unpredictable causes (e.g., Lia and Hansen, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; NIC, 2004). Further, this paper’s cautionary perspective is informed by theorists and theories of global development. These analysts offer essentially indeterminate perspectives on the world’s trajectory and a variety of speculations on the winners and losers that will emerge at different moments in time and how they will react to the conditions they confront (e.g., Korten, 1996; Thurow, 1996, Fukuyama, 1999; Perlas, 2000; World Bank 2002; Friedman, 2005).

Another reason for assuming that terrorism – even if successfully dealt with - will have an enduring effect on societies is that once counter-terrorism laws are passed and measures applied such a shift of power from citizen to state is difficult to redress. Inclusion of legal sunset clauses that call for periodic renewal, for example, of controversial restrictions on civil liberties or access to information, are no guarantee of return to conditions where people are both ‘more secure and more free’ (paraphrasing Sidel, 2004). The Leviathan never sleeps.

Spurred by the events and conditions sketched above, it will be argued that international aid is being drawn into strategies and infrastructures that are designed to directly combat terrorism as well as reduce the probability of conflicts arising. Because of the interest shown in them by a state’s security services, a particular point of reference is nongovernmental development organisations (NGDOs) within civil society.

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1 I would like to thank Kees Biekart, Patrick Bond Alnoor Ebrahim and John Hailey for critical comments and acknowledge the contribution of Joe McMahon and Oliver Bakewell in the work lying behind this paper. Though without direct citation, Part 4 draws on a collaboratively drafted research proposal.

2 At the time of writing, the news is reporting a second pattern of bombing on the London transport system.


5 Renewal of contentious clauses in the US Patriot Act seems even more certain after the London bombings.
Analysis is presented in three parts. Part one addresses the question: why does terrorism and insecurity require a development response? Answers are found in the premise, explored in section 2, that poverty and an inability of some governments to adequately control their territories create conditions that can nurture instability, insecurity and create space for ‘terrorisms’ to flourish. By implication, international aid therefore needs to re-orient and apply itself to removing these conditions. What this might entail is investigated, in section 3, by identifying criteria that could be applied to determine where this reorientation might lead in terms of countries and range of development activities.

While security involves all development actors, civil society is particularly important because of its multifaceted roles in both reducing poverty and in redressing state weakness – functions that can be politically misunderstood or at odds with each other. Part two therefore locates civil society organisations (CSOs) in an aid for security agenda. In section 4 terms are defined and a complexity-based perspective on the evolution of state-society relations is applied. This analysis is then combined with the findings of Part one to examine two areas of implications for NGDOs. Section 5, looks in detail at what compliance with counter terrorism legislation and procedures might entail for NGDOs that work internationally as givers or receivers of resources, particularly finance that could be diverted from legitimate development tasks. Section 6, adopts a broader optic to consider implications for NGDO identity, strategies and programmes. Finally, Part three, contains four propositions that focus attention on deeper lying, thematic and systemic issues for NGDOs that a development for security (DfS) era implies.

PART I: DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY: WHY AND WHERE?

What lies behind a re-orientation of international aid to expressly serve geopolitical concerns of national and international security? Where should such attention be focused and why? The following sections address these central questions that are starting to shape the coming years of development cooperation and international aid.

2. TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF POVERTY AND STATE FAILURE

The phenomena of terrorism are not new. Nor is what can be classed as a terrorist act necessarily limited to physical violence. Cyber-terrorism is but one example of the application of the concept that is not dealt with here. Rather, this section addresses the issue of definition related to violence and then sets out the purported link between terrorism and poverty that draws international aid into an emerging infrastructure for international security that will involve NGDOs and other CSOs in the trying and risky task of ‘rebuilding’ or ‘strengthening’ failed or weak states.

Defining Terrorism

The application of counter-terrorism measures presupposes or implies an (international) agreement about a definition of the concept and term. Such an agreed definition does not yet exist: wide variations are available (e.g., Gathia and Crozier, 2004). It is yet to be seen if the characterization recently proposed by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change will be accepted by member states and, if so, will make any difference to current ways that the label is selectively applied. The proposed definition for consideration by UN member states is:

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6 It could be argued that development for security is not a new paradigm, but simply a reframing of the role of international aid in service of foreign policy akin to its function during the Cold War. For elaboration on the concept of a paradigm, see Masterman, 1970.
“any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. (UN, 2004).

In terms of practical application, China regards any reference to autonomy for regions like Tibet as an act of ‘terrorism’. The Tamil Tigers probably qualify for this designation but operate openly with representatives posted in foreign capitals whose task is to publicize their cause and facilitate negotiations with external governments. In Nepal, Maoists employ the methods and aims specified in this definition of terrorism but are currently referred to as ‘rebels’. Similarly, the way in which contending parties in post-conflict settings – such as the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq - are labelled, for example, as invaders, insurgents, extremists or mercenaries, signals a very ‘pragmatic’ approach to the interpretation of terrorists and terrorism. This suggests that context, historical moment and (international) politics will be vital factors in understanding who classifies who as a terrorist, or not, and why.

Consequently, even with an agreed definition, the prospect of inconsistency, in when, where and how terrorism is understood and the label applied, is very high. This condition will create a constant state of uncertainty and risk for CSOs in terms of the applicability of CTM. Consequently, close observation and signalling of inconsistent or arbitrary application are vitally important. It is therefore to be hoped that discussions underway to establish an International Mechanism to Monitor Human Rights and Counter-terrorism and to launch a global campaign that focuses directly on the Democracy and Legitimacy of counter-terrorism measures both bear fruit.

Terrorism Causations: Poverty as Cause and Development as Solution

Countering terrorism requires an understanding about causes or driving forces and the choices about the means terrorists employ. A study by the Norwegian Defence Research Institute (Lia and Hansen, 2000:13) provides a model that includes relative deprivation as one cause. In other words, in terrorism, poverty and inequality matter. Hence development dedicated to poverty reduction – typically premised on economic investment to increase per capita GDP - has a security dimension.

“Poor countries are most at risk of violent conflict. Research on civil war shows that lower levels of GDP per capita are associated with a higher risk of violent and more prolonged conflict. All other things being equal, a country at $250 GDP per capita has an average 15% risk of experiencing a civil war in the next five years. At a GDP per capita of $5,000, the risk of civil war is less than 1%. (DFID, 2004:8)

This causative relationship is also reflected in a policy statement by the OECD-related Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on the relationship between terrorism and aid. This statement ‘recalibrates’ official aid into a security framework (OECD, 2003), creating concerns that have been collectively tabled by a number of NGDO consortia. It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail them all. Suffice it to say that NGDO disquiet focuses on a conceptualisation of the aid–terrorism relationship that: (1) makes combating terrorism

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7 Because of uncertainty about how to safely provide aid, Muslim and Arab-American groups requested that the U.S. Government develop a list of “safe” or “clean” charities – but that request was declined as not being “the government’s role.” See US scrutiny of charities leads to more research into groups, Denver Post, 09 Jan 2005; See also Washington Times, Outside View: Charity and terror, 16 Nov 2004.

8 Civicus, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is in discussion with a number of civil society organisations about these initiatives.

9 E.g., CCIC, 2004.
synonymous with combating poverty – they are not the same thing – with a danger of the former superseding the latter; (2) diversion of aid commitments for anti-terrorism and security purposes; (3) omission of a human rights dimension that informs aid policy and practice that CTM should uphold and not undermine; and (4) compromising aid eligibility criteria – such as good governance – to serve CTM agendas.

Despite these cautionary observations, it is pretty clear that the aid system is becoming subsumed within a security agenda. One example is the EU Council Committee on Counter-Terrorism Issues’ (COTER) identification of projects in support of “Global War on Terror” that are to proposed for inclusion in aid strategies and budgets under ‘security sector reform’ and ‘good governance’ programmes. Another example is concluding remarks to some 600 civil society organisations at the June 2005 Global Conference on the Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peace Building. Here, Ibrahim Gambari, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, said that development must be seen as “the first line of defence” in defusing potential conflicts and building world peace. “[In] today’s world, more than ever, development and peace are indivisible.”

However, more recent analysis suggests that poverty, while a possible co-factor, is not a significant feature in the profile of terrors most potent weapon: suicide bombers (Reuter, 2004). Their individual attributes point towards experiences of powerlessness, political marginalisation and personal grievance. These characteristics create predispositions that can be framed and exploited towards violent, self-destructive dissent by ideological discourses, be they religious, nationalist and other. This finding raises the issue of the preventive capability of governments and the danger of reservoirs of terrorism existing in ‘failed states’.

**Terrorist Prevention: Civil Society and Rebuilding Failed and Fragile States**

The probability that personal attributes translate into terrorist groupings and actions are argued to depend on the ‘success’ of statehood, narrowly understood as a practical ability to oversee and control all territory though a monopoly on the ‘legitimate’ use of force.

“Violent conflicts also have regional and global effects that can exacerbate other forms of insecurity. Civil wars create territory that is outside government control, which are fertile environments for international crime and illicit arms trafficking.” Emphasis added (DFID, 2004:8)

This perspective of inadequate control makes the quality of statehood an important component of development for security. In this framework, failed states have lost a monopoly of force or effective territorial control, e.g., Somalia. Weak states may have some overriding control in some areas but not all, e.g., Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal and Afghanistan. But weakness or ‘fragility’ can stem from many factors. Typical are: incompetence due to corruption; an ineffective and tainted judiciary; inadequate policing; over-reliance on external aid or export of natural resources that undercut the link between citizen taxation and people’s hold over political representation (Unsworth, 2002). In addition are debilitating affects of extensive informal markets; governance undermined by the penetration of underworld consortia; and alternative sources of authority that divide people’s loyalties at the cost of an adequate identification of citizens with the state. Examples are Nigeria, Liberia and Papua New Guinea.

12 Basque separatists and Irish nationalists employ violence against civilians. In fighting for a separate state, the Tamil Tigers used a suicide bomber to assassinate India’s Prime Minister, Rajeev Ghandi.
The notion of a failed state presupposes that a state succeeded in the first place. This may not always be the case, particularly in post-colonial conditions where states were not organically formed, were or are rapacious and predatory, could not sustain their territorial reach or supply even basic services. Perhaps a better approach is to regard statehood as a continual work in progress, with terrorism testing the quality of what a strong state means. Robert Cooper (2004) offers one perspective in this direction by dividing the world into three types of state. The first is pre-modern in terms of territorial integrity, stability and effective statehood, all of which are actively problematic. The second are stable, effective and modern but (nationalistically) self-focused and not necessarily enamoured by or willing to adhere to international laws, norms and standards of human rights or behaviour in terms of democratic governance or foreign relations. The third type is strong in terms of statehood and state craft, more internationalist in outlook and inclined to a rule-bound approach to internal behaviour and international affairs. An implicit evolution is that the quality of statehood increases because of greater legitimacy when force is deployed with adequate, civic-political rule-bound restraint on its abuse at home and abroad.

In this frame, terrorism is more likely to be nurtured within the first type of state that needs to be ‘rebuilt’ towards the third, hopefully – because of human rights weaknesses - missing out the second. Such a progression presupposes that the developmental science and art of building from a type-one to a type-three state is adequately understood and practically possible. Experience with this task in the first three development decades was tainted by Cold War rivalry, now paralleled by the counter-terrorism lens of allies and foes expressed in terms of ‘fundamentalisms’. Be that as it may, introducing the repair of failed or weak states to make them robust and democratic is becoming a defining feature of development for security. How does such state-building proceed? Specifically, where do civil society and NGDOs fit into the picture – dealt with in Part II - and what is the picture anyway?

In terms of a future picture, a supposition that a world full of liberal democracies mirrored on the West is possible and will be stable and conflict-free is highly problematic (Dunn, 2004) and beyond the scope of this paper to address in detail. One cautionary observation, however, is that democratic politics exemplified in stage three ‘mature’ democracies is showing signs of failure. Voter apathy, democratic deficits and a dysfunctional separation between the political class and citizens underlying the French and Dutch votes against the EU Constitution suggest that this model can no longer be relied on or act as exemplar. Moreover, the gerrymandering of voter districts in the USA is purposefully and systematically reducing the substantive uncertainty required if democracy is to be robust (Schedler, 2001:19). Hardly an example to aspire to, which invites NGDOs and civil society more broadly, to both actively consider and work towards more citizen-centric forms of political organisation (Clark, 2003; Monbiot, 2003; Scholte, 2003; Bruyn, 2005).

In sum, there is evidence that the aid system is entering another new era of objectives and measures of success (Duffield, 1999). A reframing of development for security may explain why, after so many years of NGDO agitation, most European donor countries have recently agreed to reach an average of 0.5 percent of national GDP as their aid contribution by 2010. Why now? Why not five years ago or five years hence? Is an increase now intended to finance COTER’s security proposals from aid budgets? Does this decision indicate that the West is heavily investing in its own physical security by making life less intolerable, more just – or perhaps through CTMs more oppressive - for so many of the world’s poor, marginalized and disaffected? Is this an updated version of the hardly successful ‘enlightened self-interest’ of aid’s past, but now with much, much higher stakes? The timing suggests so.

13 The wild card noted by Cooper is the United States of America that – as global watchman in its policing sense - selectively chooses to accept or reject international norms and rules as it sees fit. No one is policing today’s global policeman in the building of empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000).
3. DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY: A SECURITY GEOGRAPHY

If, as argued, development for security is the emerging paradigm for international aid, where should efforts be concentrated? Given the country base of aid relations, this section addresses the question in terms of geography. It does so by bringing together indicators related both to poverty and to state failure or fragility and then ranking countries accordingly.

Development for Security: Criteria For Aid Prioritisation

Conditions of state fragility and endemic poverty constitute a potentially worse case scenario that would merit priority attention from the international community and aid. Indeed, it could be argued that it is precisely the weakness of a state that is responsible for an inability to address problems of mass poverty and visa versa. This mutually reinforcing and negative spiral of causation constitutes a poverty/fragility trap (BOND, 2005). Such conditions invite prioritisation in terms of international efforts and a particular mix of remedies, central to which is the strengthening of state in terms of its capabilities to deliver services, including security, which must be allied to effective accountability and respect for human rights.

Development Criteria

To guide its efforts and chart its progress the aid system generates and relies on key indicators of human well-being. The United Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index and World Bank measures of poverty are common points of reference for prioritizing development effort. To these can be added specific Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with an overarching objective to, by 2015, reduce by half the number of people living in absolute poverty. MDGs require attention not just to proportions of people who are poor, but also their total number in a given country. Development for security will remain informed by such country-by-country measures and comparisons. In terms of poverty as a source of insecurity, four measures are of direct relevance. Inequality – which is strongly mediated by public policies and their enforcement in relation to taxation and redistribution – provides an important link between development and statehood criteria.

1. UNDP Human Development Index.
   This Index is a ranking that combines three dimensions of human well-being as outcomes of many determinants. The specific outcomes comprising the developing countries Index (HDI) are Human Life expectancy at birth, Adult literacy rate and Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools and GDP per capita (using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP US$). Human Poverty Indices (HPI) are now also being generated for developing (HPI-1) and developed countries (HP1-2). But for purposes of aid allocation, proportions of populations below poverty lines are an additional metric.

2. Percentage of population below a national per capita income poverty line.
   Poverty is a situational experience with both absolute and relative dimensions. Measures of income or consumption poverty are established nationally and a datum established to determine the proportion of population below this level. Poverty reduction strategies typically use this reference point for aid allocation within a country.

3. Population below an international per capita income poverty line.
   Poverty is compared and countries ranked according to an international datum of US$ 1 or US$2 per day. This metric is used for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as an indicator of people living in absolute poverty and hence a priority of aid allocation. Countries of sub-Saharan Africa are particularly prevalent when this measure is applied.

4. Absolute number of population under US$1 a day international poverty line. Despite the moral issues involved, partly for reasons of institutional efficiency, aid allocation is also informed by the absolute numbers of people living in absolute poverty. South and East Asian countries feature more often when this measure is applied.

5. Economic inequality
An early warning sign in cases of state failure is uneven development exhibited in growing economic inequality within a state, not merely levels of poverty. A recent United Nations Report (UN, 2005) views inequality as a ‘predicament’, rather than an injustice. On the one hand, income disparities act as incentive and spur to human endeavour and economic growth. On the other hand increases in disparity and inequality can foster a deepening sense of unfairness that can translate into grievances that alienate and destabilise society, escalating into physical disorder or insurrection. Tracing the problem to the amoral nature of economic globalisation, the report’s analysis reads:

“Violence is often rooted in inequality. It is dangerous for both national and international peace and security to allow economic and political inequality to deepen. Such inequalities, especially struggles over political power, land and other assets can create social disintegration and exclusion and lead to conflict and violence.”

A Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure of economic inequality. The coefficient varies between 0, which reflects complete equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person has all the income or consumption, all others have none). The coefficient is calculated from the proportional share of income or consumption for each decile of a population. Political inequality is a function of statehood criteria discussed next.

Statehood criteria
A development for security framework requires measures to assess and track features of statehood. Three relevant metrics have been established: the quality of governance; potential for state failure; and the degree to which democracy is practiced, exemplified by the freedoms that citizens enjoy. Such, overlapping, systematic analysis is frequently presented as a ranking of states. In all cases, data is based on greater or lesser numbers of observer opinions converted into numerical ranges.

6. Governance
Governance links the quality of political system in terms of inclusion and legitimacy of mandate with the quality of public administration. The World Bank Governance Index is composed of six indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. These indicators “… reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.”

7. Potential for state failure.
Again applying numerical values to observer assessments, the potential for state failure - an estimation of the potential for conflict - is computed from twelve indicators: Demographic Pressures, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Group Grievances, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Deligitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalised Elites and External Intervention. These potential

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16 For example, the UN’s initiative to promote “ethical globalization”, led by Mary Robinson is indicative of the perceived need to counter an amoral process of economic integration.
sources of state failure can be set against an assessment of the ability of state institutions to cope. The result is an estimate of the probability that a state will be a source of conflict with effects within and beyond its borders.\footnote{Fund For Peace, Washington, DC. <http://fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/caststep/>}

8. Degree of democratic freedom and process
Estimates of democracy published by WorldAudit.org are approached through a country’s adherence to international agreements on political rights and civil liberties. These two dimensions establish divisions within which indicators of press freedom and degree of corruption are applied to compute an overall score and hence a comparative ranking.\footnote{<http://www.worldaudit.org/methodology.htm>}

What this expanded perspective for aid allocations might mean in practice is illustrated in Table 1 which shows the thirty countries most poorly placed in each category of criteria.

However, the choice of indicators, data sources, methods and computations described above must be viewed critically. For example, development measures are more amenable to hard numerical approaches. But weaknesses in statistical services across the world, irregular reporting over time and manipulating data to serve political ends all invite caution in terms of validity.

Statehood quality rankings rely on subjective assessments with varied degrees of triangulation. Explicit or implicit agendas of the organisations undertaking such work also need to be considered. Further, rankings do not necessarily include all countries of the world that impedes proper comparisons. Anomalies are not uncommon: is Eritrea more democratic than Ethiopia or Bangladesh? At best most indicators are, indeed, simply indicative, not definitive and must be treated as such.
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21 Column 4, commences with highest number of poor. All other column commence with the lowest ranked country against each criteria.
24 World Development Report 2005, Table 2.7, World Bank Washington DC. Percentage of population below international poverty line of $1 per day.
25 Computed from World Development Report Table 2.5 percentages and World Development Indicators on Population. Note: India = 381 million; Venezuela = 4 million.
26 World Development Report 2005, Table 2.7, World Bank Washington DC. Note: Significant variation in year of data.
28 Foreign Policy, July/August, 2005.
29 World Audit, Democracy Table May 2005. [http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm](http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm)
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Nevertheless, the problem of information quality faces aid agencies that must make decisions about where to engage to what extent and in what areas of action. With this in mind, as a heuristic a device to delineate the security geography of DfS, Table 2., extracts information from the ninety-seven countries in Table 1., by enumerating columns in which a country occurs. The number of DfS dimensions a country reflects forms a rough estimate for priority attention by international aid for (inter)national security.

Table 2. The geo-politics of development for security - country priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Entries</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Zimbabwe.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nigeria, Zambia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Venezuela.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Haiti, Ivory Coast, Lao PDR, Niger, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Yemen.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Angola, Burma, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Ghana, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, North Korea, Peru, Somalia, Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Philippines, South Africa, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya, Malaysia, Moldova, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Solomon Islands, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, West Bank.</td>
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</table>

Though certainly necessary and planned, it is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake detailed analysis of what this composition says about why specific combinations exist and play out for each country. Moreover, realist geopolitics affect whether or not international aid is available to governments and civil society. Examples are Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Similarly, the war on terror keeps countries with appalling human rights records, like Turkmenistan, within the fold of the favoured. Nevertheless, there are numerous settings where urgent or extreme geopolitics are not in play and where the above criteria can act as a guide for examining the actual behaviour of the aid system. Consequently, this broad overview is a useful starting point for determining the probability of aid being allocated in relation to the above prioritisation and the case-by-case tailored mix of development assistance required.30

For our present purposes, it is sufficient to argue that each dimension determining the allocation of aid is relevant to the CSO operating environment, albeit in different ways with different trade-offs. With this country profile and agenda in mind, it is necessary to consider what development for security means for civil society in general and NGDOs in particular.

PART II CIVIL SOCIETY IN AN ERA OF DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY

It can be argued that a development paradigm where quality of statehood stands central is both belated and necessary. This shift more accurately reflects the political nature of development and empowerment as a professed outcome of international aid. It allows a more explicit acknowledgement of civil society as a political concept that is not adequately expressed in the term NGDO, a residual category of negative attributes - non-state and non-profit - that has often been confused with civil society itself (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000:295). Revisiting civil society in its political essence - the subject of section 4 - is a necessary starting point for establishing its place and contribution in a security-driven aid agenda. The conceptual grounding for state-civil society relations then allows an appraisal of implications of a development for security agenda in two dimensions. Section 5 deals with

30 Further analysis and publications will undertake such a task.
compliance with the counter-terrorism measures that accompany the new aid agenda. Section 6, addresses strategic dimensions of NGDO political economy and its influence on development programmes.

4. CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATES: OF POWER AND ITS DISTRIBUTION

Contending theories of civil society have two attributes in common. First, they seek to explain how power between institutions of the state and those of society are acquired, distributed, applied and controlled. Second, the concepts and definitions constructed and deployed are self-referential to the theory in which they are embedded and, hence, unfalsifiable in a scientific sense (Popper, 1963). With these problems in mind, the discussion of civil society and its role on countering insecurity through poverty and state building - understood as democratization - applies methods of complexity analysis. This does not resolve the difficulty, but allows a review of the theoretical terrain through a composite and inclusive lens.

Civil society: definition, ontology, components and configurations

After a period of neglect, prompted by the implosion of the Soviet Union, the past decade has seen academic, political, policy and media interest in the concept and expressions of civil society (e.g., Cohen and Arato, 1992; Gellner, 1994; Howell and Pearce, 2002; Chambers, and Kymlicka, 2002; Edwards, 2004; Hodgkinson and Foley, 2004). Despite the associated conceptual pitfalls and fuzzy boundaries faced by all writers in this field, the analysis that follows requires working definitions of what civil society is and contains. For the purposes of this paper, civil society will be understood as a public terrain bounded by families, the state and private enterprise and constituted by associational forms freely initiated by citizens to pursue their interests. Independently constituted, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are legally registered, nonprofit and not-for-profit subset of CSOs operating within civil society for the benefit of members or for the public good.

Nongovernmental development organisations (NDGOs) are a class of NGOs allied to – though not necessarily aligned with - an international system of development cooperation, its agenda, architecture, policies and resource flows. Typically, NGDOs act as intermediaries in a redistributional chain between private and public resource providers and groups in society meriting assistance. Such groups are overwhelmingly poor, marginalized, oppressed and denied their rights. Collectively comprising between 1.1 and 2.7 billion people in developing countries, woman and children form a disproportionately large part of this category. Located within civil society, community-based organisations (CBOs), mutual assurance and support groups, social movements, cults and sects are frequent forms through which people self-organise. In distinction to NGDOs, they are more likely to be membership-based and member serving. These formations create an array of traditional, informal and more formalised registered entities that may be enduring or time-bound or task specific.

The above categorization invites a question of whether or not citizen's organisations that do not adhere to norms of non-violence and exhibit uncivil behaviour – such as terrorist cells, racist skinheads, etc – are part of civil society. Despite variation in definitions, central to all

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31 Institutions are stable patterns of values, norms, standards and organisations that a society values, characterised by four relatively distinct, interdependent domains of families, state, commerce and citizen-driven associations.

32 For analytic accuracy, a distinction will be made within the state between a political system that generates a ruling regime and the government with its varied instruments and agencies, including armed forces, police and public administration.

33 Civic associations can be formally, legally registered or remain informal in terms of legal status.

34 World Bank, Development Indicators, 2005. < http://web.worldbank.org/dwbsite/external/news> 1st August, 2005. The absolute number depends on whether the poverty income threshold is set at $1 or $2 per day.
theories is civil society as a political concept intimately connected to the phenomenon of a nation-state. To the extent that civic entities use violent or uncivil behaviour to further their agendas – for example, to change a government’s domestic policy or its international relations – such bodies merit inclusion as a shadow side of civil society.

Dusting off the covers of old ideas pointed to the lack of extant information about what civil society – with its vague and contested definitions and boundaries, allied to a narrow geographic and historical empirical bias – actually looked like across the world. Prompted by this lacuna, resources have been applied to mapping civil society. Such exercises can reflect pre-conceived ideas and self-referential analytic categories (Steinberg and Young, 1998) or rely on shallow, descriptive data (e.g., Civicus, 1997). Most notable advance in terms of empirically based mapping (in thirty-seven countries) has been achieved by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit project (CNP). As its title suggests, the perspective is informed by economic epistemologies associated with nonprofit theories. The research universe in the countries investigated through CNP reflects an ahistorical empirical bias to the exclusion, for example, of not-for-profit civic formations. (Morris, 2000) Such entities constitute a formalised économie sociale component within civil society in countries of continental Europe. In addition, in many developing countries, organisations of the social economy are an important informal means for survival of people who are poor. However, the limited groundwork provided by CNP is being complemented by other mapping exercises with more political or holistic and less deterministic conceptual origins and instrumentation.

Today, though still very uneven in global coverage, country-by-country landscapes of civil society and its constituent parts are now appearing. The profiles available confirm two facts relevant to this paper. First, configuration of civil society – understood as its forms, functions, norms and relationships - is path dependent and indeterminate. Like society itself, civil society is highly diverse and continually coming into being. Hence, excessively parsimonious and overly reductionist theories of civil society’s ontology that draw on a single genus of social processes are insufficiently robust to satisfy an adequate range of descriptive, explicative and analytic needs (Popper, 1982; Rule, 1992; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Ragin, 1999). A potentially stronger analytic perspective is provided by complexity theory (Lewin, 1994; Cilliers, 1998). Civil society configurations can be explained as emergent (Johnson, 2001) from complex interplays between dynamic forces within and between states (Kaufman, 1995). At any moment in time, CSO presence and arrangements can be understood in relation to the continuing evolution and unfolding interplay between socio-cultural foundations, including belief systems; continuous (re)constitution of the economy; the development of political forces, ideologies and regime types; the form and application of public governance; and the actions of civil society. In other words, civil society co-determines itself by its action on other forces that shape its own formation. This is not a circularity, but continual complexification within and beyond the civic domain (Casti, 1994).

35 For discussion on biases see Hann and Dunn, 1994; Lewis, 2004.
36 The difference between nonprofit and non-for – profit organisations is not simply semantic. Though not a widely accepted or uncontested distinction, nonprofit NGDO applies to organisations that operate on a purely charitable basis, rely on donations and grants and do not engage in any form of commercial activity. Not-for-profit NGDOs may undertake income-generating activities as part of their operations but no profit – or better said financial surplus - is distributed. Where not-for-profits are member serving - such as cooperatives and mutual assurance organisations – they form a recognised part of the social economy (Defourney, et al, 2000). When not member serving, not-for-profits operate as a nonprofit-commercial hybrid that can invite suspicion about ownership, motives, charges about unfair commercial competition and severe management challenges.
37 The largest study is the Civicus Civil Society Index, a comprehensive action-research civil society mapping project being implemented in some 60 countries. A twenty-one country comparative project investigating civil society in relation to political processes was completed by the Institute for development Studies, University of Sussex.
38 For updated references, see www.jhu.edu/ccss; www.civicus.org/csi; www.ids.ac.uk/ids/research/index.html.
Configuring civil society entails interaction between citizens as transacting agents who, in pursuit of their interests, continually (re)define and test the rules and norms guiding civic association, collaboration and competition. These processes involve struggle, contention, negotiation, alliance-building, networking, layering and scalar nesting of citizen’s associations and their expressions in higher order institutional forms and arrangements. Such processes are organically reflected in the decay, transformation, regeneration and innovation of civil society’s constituent parts, relationships and tiers and modes of aggregation and systemic construction from local to transnational levels (Florini, 2000; Chesters, 2004, Taylor, 2004). Civil society co-evolves in uneven interaction with other institutional domains. The processes involved are attracted by and pivot around structuration that evolves as division of roles, responsibilities and authority. Most important in this dynamic is the acquisition and distribution of types of political power (Haugaard, 1997; Lukes, 2005) between citizen and state. Here, resolution is sought with respect to determination of public and private terrains allied to the legitimacy, scope, rules and conditions applied to a state’s coercive force in the management of human affairs and in (inter-) state development (Bates, 2001).

Configurations may become stable, but resolution is never finalised or permanently optimal. All institutions remain in a constant, interdependent condition of evolution and becoming. At any moment, collaboration, competition and contention between (parts of) a state and civil society remain features of reconfiguration. They manifest in terms of struggles related to control over civil society’s material base, its civic-political forms and the power of associations and their location and function in terms of aiding, abetting or contesting tendencies towards hegemony of specific interests within systems of governance. Nevertheless, over time relative stability can be achieved through socialisation of emergent norms, conventions rules and adequately accepted distributions of power and authority, formalised in laws and institutional arrangements that regulate and mediate relations within civil society and towards government and the market. The duration of these periods and their content are historically determined and country specific. Profiles generated by CSO mapping described previously reflect the diverse outcomes of these complex processes.

Civil society formation and change is also, to greater or lesser degrees, co-determined by external forces penetrating existing, or even forming, countries: exemplified by colonially imposed and delineated nation states. Of significance for this paper is that some forty years of international aid has served as one transmission device co-determining the configuring of civil society in many developing countries as well as in countries of the former Soviet Union (Rau, 1991; van Rooy, 1998). In distinction, such penetrative effects are hardly to be found in the make-up of civil societies in countries that donate aid. An important difference, for example, is that NGDOs in developed countries – the North - are products of and are rooted in their own economies. By contrast, in developing countries – the South - local NGDOs are seldom economically embedded. Most will collapse if and when foreign aid is withdrawn. In other words, there is marked asymmetry between North and South in terms of the power, forces and experiences shaping a society’s institutional ecology and divisions of roles between and within its major domains.

Together, the nature of civil society formation described above, its roles in politics and governance, and the asymmetry between northern and southern NGDOs all have an

39 These new institutional levels feedback into the constituent parts that created them.
40 This unique attribute of states is attributed to Max Weber in 1918 and still poses unresolved issues in relation to whether monopoly of force is an legitimate, intrinsic attribute of a state or is conditional on acceptance by citizens within negotiated rules of its use. http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~iridener/DSS/Weber/polvoc.html (translation).
41 These features stand central to theories formulated by Marx, De Tocqueville and Gramsci respectively.
42 Important determinants of civil society configurations and functions are freedom of association, profile of resource availability, access to information, ability to voice and engage in public affairs and the institutional pathways for negotiation of and mediation between interests.
important bearing in a scenario where development is intended to serve security.

**NGDO Functions, Finance and Outreach**

Aside from their roles in humanitarian crises – not covered in detail by this paper - NGDOs typically fulfil two development functions. Located between funder and ultimate recipient NGDOs are downwardly operational as supply-side providers of social, economic and similar services, usually to and through CBOs. In addition, or as an alternative, NGDOs are upwardly vocal, demand-side advocates with respect to those they serve as well as acting in ways that improve governance as watchdogs and whistleblowers. In both cases, human rights frequently provide a framework for their activities. And a rights perspective is often allied to an objective of ‘building the capacity’ of poor people to become empowered and engaged citizens and enactors of their own development. Creating new and strengthening existing CSOs is a major strategy in reaching such an objective. This goal is shared by official aid agencies that - to promote democracy and good governance - expressly finance NGDOs to undertake this type of task (van Rooy, 1998; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000).

The relative proportion of NGDOs fulfilling these dual roles is context specific. Nevertheless, governments tend to be more amenable to service provision than advocacy. In the case of the latter, the borderline between CSOs improving governance and interfering in politics is easily wilfully misread and reacted against. As Isaiah Berlin observes: “there is consequently, no consensus on the frontier between valid public criticism and subversion …” (Berlin, 1997:65). Consequently, for NGDOs the risks associated with service delivery are less than for influencing governance. This actuality tends to negatively affect the emergence of activist-oriented NGDOs within civil society everywhere. But in the South, it also inhibits an ability to raise local finance for domestic NGDO’s work. In other words, they remain more aid-dependent, which can weaken their local identity and legitimacy.

Available estimates indicate that to fulfil supply and demand functions NGDOs annually raise and disburse some US$12-15 billion US dollars (Fowler, 2005). Of importance is that governments are now a majority source of the funds NGDOs deploy. Consequently, NGDO behaviour and viability are often co-determined by the policy and practice of official aid. This reality for organisational viability poses significant challenges when the paradigm for aid shifts from poverty reduction as an end in itself to poverty reduction as means to an end – security and conflict prevention.

In the global scheme of financial transfers, NGDO finance is a very small sum. For example, Diasporas are estimated to transfer more than $100 billion per annum (Goldring, 2004) and financial markets US$ 1 Trillion in a day. But, as argued later in terms of terrorism, small untraceable amounts matter much more than big, well-tracked disbursements. This is one factor that draws NGDOs into the purview of government security agencies.

Although there is no global compendium or database, existing evidence suggests significant variation in the presence of NGDOs in countries across the world. For example, the ratio of NGDOs to population in three adjoining East African countries are 1:5,802 in Uganda with 2,136 NGDOs; 1:10,128 in Kenya with 2,962 NGDOs; and 1:46,435 in Ethiopia with 1,455 NGDOs. This variation can be attributed, inter alia, to historical factors, the legal and policy conditions set by government and the size of aid as a proportion of GDP. Bangladesh hosts some 20,000 NGDOs, with one estimate of 3.5 NGDOs per square mile. At a national extreme, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) employs over 30,000 staff.

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45 [www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/Park/6443/Bangladesh/chris.html](http://www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/Park/6443/Bangladesh/chris.html)
with an annual budget of US$100 million, much now self generated. BRAC’s outreach is to about a third of the country’s 130 million people. At an international extreme, World Vision has an annual budget of US$1.55 billion per year and estimates reaching some 70 million people in need. Less visible but no less noteworthy are many thousands of small NGDOs exhibiting varied levels of commitment, competence and scale of operations. In terms of the South, as a rule of thumb, the number and significance of NGDOs is positively correlated with the proportion of international aid in government budgets because such finance generally operates with pro-NGDO funding policies, conditions and specific financial commitments.\footnote{Such policies are part-informed by donor concerns about government corruption and aid absorption capabilities.}

In contrast, the place and proportion of NGDOs within donor countries is moderate. Domestic issues tend to dominate in citizen’s concerns. NGDOs figure in hundreds rather than thousands, forming a very small proportion of registered charities. For example, of some 166,000 registered charities in the United Kingdom, some 300 are members of the BOND, a network dedicated to international development and development education. Overall, an estimate of NGDOs totalling a hundred thousand across the world would not seem unrealistic. But of more significance is NGDO interfacing with hundreds of thousands of organisations at the base of civil society – the primary civic associations inhabited by (unregistered) community based organisations, social movements and religious sects. This dimension of outreach is one further reason for the attention of security services.

NGDOs also have transnational expressions that operate on an array of supra-national scales, becoming a significant factor in some areas of global governance and policy making (e.g., Fox and Brown, 1998; Scholte, 2002). The success of NGDOs at putting and keeping poverty on the agenda at the G8 meeting in July 2005 at Gleneagles is the most recent example of an international impact that is provoking a further backlash by some governments (Bond, 2000; van Rooy, 2004) as well as from NGDOs with contrary opinions.\footnote{Concerned about the unaccountable influence of NGDOs, the American Enterprise Institute has initiated an NGDO Watch programme.}

In sum, estimates suggest that NGDOs directly reach some 20 percent of the world’s poor, between 250 and 500 million people (Fowler, 2000). The other pathway for NGDO outreach is indirect through campaigns, lobbying, and advocacy to other parts of the aid system and, increasingly, to structurally important non-aid institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and International Criminal Court. The potential impact of NGDOs through these means cannot be realistically assessed. But logic indicates a potentially larger scale of achievement in terms of altering global conditions in favour of the world’s poor. And these positive impacts for the poor are important because of the presumed role of poverty as a crucible for insecurity, conflict and terrorism. However, the probability of poverty becoming an actual source of insecurity both locally and beyond is mediated by the condition of government and governance.

**Civil society and state building**

Development for security places direct and heavier stress on redressing poor statehood. The retreating development era viewed the problem of statehood though a mainly apolitical lens. Typical aid projects funded improvements in the mechanics of electoral systems, financed civic education, supported independent media and communications, developed...
CSO presence and competencies to advocate on issues, monitor human rights, analysis government budgets and disbursements and promote legal reforms to improve the CSO operating environment. Where circumstances and moments permitted, support was given to processes of constitutional review. Generally speaking, the approach was to avoid allegations of interfering in a country’s internal affairs by engaging with governance processes in a managerial, technical, capacity-building based way. The civic vehicle was predominantly urban based, middle-class NGDOs as the assumed central non-state actors in democratic promotion (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000:295).

Analysis suggest that the results of this approach were generally disappointing. Findings point at the necessity to “… pop the bubble of the idea that civil society development is somehow a safely apolitical domain.” This conclusion resonates with recent conclusions of an examination of long-term trend data on democratization involving sixty-seven countries (Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005). Successful transitions from undemocratic to stable democratic conditions in thirty-three of these countries provide useful insights about the role of civil society in such processes. Three conclusions of this study are of particular interest.

“The central conclusion of this study is that how a transition from authoritarianism occurs and the types of forces that are engaged in press the transition have significant impact on success or failure of democratic reform.” Emphasis added.

“… in a preponderance of successful transitions, the most dramatic improvements in freedom tend to come quickly – in the first years of transition, rather than slowly and incrementally over a long period of time, underscoring the importance of the nature of the civic and political forces that emerge as important actors in the pre-transition period.”

“… far more often than is generally understood, the change agent is broad-based, nonviolent civic resistance – which employs tactics such as boycotts, mass protests, blockades, strikes, and civil disobedience to de-legitimate authoritarian rulers and erode their sources of support, including the loyalty of their armed defenders.” Emphasis added (ibid:2)

These findings may not correspond to conditions in weak countries to be found in Table 2., that may be relatively free of authoritarian rule, albeit not robust democracies. They also need to be adjudicated against types of diversity in civil society configurations. Nevertheless the number of cases, point to the importance of political evolutions that arise and broaden from below rather than are instigated and guided from above. The processes required call for methods that engender non-violent contention and its resolution rather than an over-reliance on ‘partnership’ or a ‘harmony’ model of state building. Put another way, if a world of strong states based on democratic rule is crucial for stability and security, the aid system and NGDOs have to contend with the fact – reflected in the history of donor countries - that attaining a robust democracy is a process of struggle as well as of collaboration, where civil society has a vital role of protagonist. That processes of substantive democratization involve and generate greater contention is both theoretically predictable and already observed in development programmes that ‘build’ democracy by strengthening the advocacy capabilities of CSOs (Blair, 1998, 2002).

In sum, the evidence and arguments presented so far suggest that development for security will erode a ‘comfort zone’ of development as an apolitical and technical enterprise. Responding to this alteration in environment - conditioned as it is by anxiety about terrorism

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49 A counter-argument, reflecting a non-necessitarian historical perspective (Unger, 1987), is that under today’s conditions of inter-dependence, technologies, multiple institutions and availability of aid, fragile states can avoid the historical processes of internal contention exhibited in the West. That is, they can negotiate and partner their way to development and robust systems of good governance. The evidence for this conviction is hard to find. The study cited spans some thirty-five years to 2002 and testifies to an alternative view and recent experience.
and its prevention - has many implications for CSOs and NGDOs more specifically. What this might mean is discussed next, first in relation to CTMs and then with respect to NGDO political economy and development practice.

5. DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY: NGDOs AND TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE

The preceding discussion contends that in a broad and long-term sense CTMs have revised the philosophy and morality of official aid and that this shift is now filtering through the system as a ‘recalibration’ of donor policies, preferences and practices. Implications for aid allocation, detailed in Part II, indicate the likely content that the new framework will embrace as well as countries probably inviting most interest. Corresponding implications for NGDOs can be identified in relation to technical and organisational aspects of compliance with CTMs as well as in terms of institutional positioning, strategy and development programming. This section examines technical and organisational issues. It does so after arguing why NGDOs are subject to so much scrutiny from security services.

Legal and administrative compliance

Aside from re-arranging and strengthening security services, as noted in the Introduction, a primary structural response to prevent violent terrorism has been the passing of new legislation in countries of the North and South. Where this has not been thought necessary or desirable, existing administrative procedures can be employed to achieve similar ends. The following paragraphs consider possible consequences of both options for NGDOs.

Laws apply across all elements of society and some purport to have global effect. They call for interpretation and application by different arms of government and require compliance by individual citizens and incorporated bodies. For example, because of uncertainty about how funds are being used, CTMs have a bearing on the world-wide response to the Boxing Day tsunami. In some countries counter-terrorism activity is very public. In others, the approach is lower key, but nonetheless as potentially significant in terms of implications.

Because Laws to combat terrorism cover such broad subject matter and have global application, CTM affects every relationship within the aid system – from back donor to the local office of an International NGDO to southern NGDO and the southern community and its residents. Not only do the Laws affect each institution in this long chain – but within each, the Laws affect its officers, directors, employees and other directly related persons. The ripple or wave caused by the CTM ‘stone’ reaches every corner of the global ‘pond.’ It affects even those who have never heard of CTM or its associated Laws.

Laws are critical tools in a central approach to combating terrorism: starvation of funding, allied to tracing terrorists through the resources they mobilise. The sums involved in terrorist attacks are not necessarily large. For example, the Madrid train bombing is thought to have cost around fifteen thousand Euros. The use of charities and nonprofit organisations to launder money from drugs, human trafficking and so on was already the subject of preventive measures. However, as the following quote indicates, counter-terrorism introduced a new urgency and dimension to what authorities were trying to curtail and trace.


51 For example, the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist And Related Activities Act 33 was passed in South Africa in February 2004 and came into effect in April 2005. Kenya’s attempted to introduce counter terrorism laws which met with much hostility and claims that it violated the Constitution. The original Bill was withdrawn. Post 9/11, terrorist legislation has been passed or amended in, amongst others, India, Nepal and Malaysia.

52 “Muslims called to give but wary of what they fund”, 09 Jan 2005, Denver Post, USA. See also “Authorities warn as radical groups pour into Aceh”, Globe and Mail, 05 January 2005.

“Charities, NGDOs, and non-profits have been identified as a “crucial weak point” in anti-money laundering and terrorist financing initiatives of the international community. It is increasingly important for all charities, particularly those operating internationally, to be aware of both national and international legislative developments in this regard worldwide. These initiatives have brought about a ‘new day’ for charities, in which national boundaries may not limit the scope of supranational initiatives and legislation of other states. Increasing levels of information sharing between states, and heightened surveillance of the operations of charities working internationally, are already concrete realities for charities.” (Carter and Associates, 2004:7)

To a significant extent, the Laws introduce and rely on government-specified lists of proscribed individuals and organisations. Such lists are shared between governments and are posted globally on the Internet.

“The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has compiled the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which includes all persons who have been named in the Executive Order or who have been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury or Secretary of State as terrorists or supporters of terrorism. Because the Executive Order bars transactions with persons on the list, funders must decide whether their circumstances require them to check their grantee organizations – and individuals associated with grantees – against the SDN list. Because the Executive Order also prohibits transactions with persons who may be aiding others on the list, funders also must decide whether they should check lists maintained by other U.S. government agencies, the European Union, the United Nations and other countries.”

Because lists come from national and international security services and the prospect of terrorist acts makes governments risk averse, the list cannot be effectively challenged. For example, a British charity named Interpal was designated as a terrorist organisation by the US government, for its alleged role of channelling funds to Hamas. The Charity Commission found no evidence of illegal activity on the part of Interpal and indicated that the charity is a "well run and committed". Despite this finding, the British government would not intercede to have the designation removed.

Where legislation is a government’s counter-terrorism strategy of choice, three major interlocking types of compliance approaches can be seen. They can be summarised as ‘know yourself’, ‘know your partner +’, and ‘follow the money.’ Together they bring a number of organisational implications. The U.S. is probably the most advanced in applying and refining a strongly legislative approach to CTM. Therefore, while perhaps extreme, U.S. examples show what might occur, be adopted or copied elsewhere.

**Know yourself**
Legislation and ‘voluntary best practices’ require an NGDO to ensure that none of their staff or those known to be providing funding are on a proscribed list. For example, in July 2004 the director of the Combined Federal Campaign - a U.S. system that provides automatic deduction of payments to nonprofits organisations from the salaries of government employees – affirmed that participating organisations must certify that they do not employ anyone named on government terrorist lists.

‘Know yourself,’ also implies adopting and continually monitoring procedures and systems to

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54 *Foundation News and Commentary*, 45 (3), May/June 2004, Washington, DC.
55 Letter from BOND, British Organisation of NGDOs for Development, 7 December 2004. A similar blacklisting of a Danish NGDO also proved to be unfounded, but with not redress the organisation was advised to change its name and seek new partners overseas.
ensure compliance with what CTM Laws require. A natural tension arises from the ‘know yourself’ maxim when NGDO employees find themselves subject to employer scrutiny. Moreover, CTM practices also suggest that NGDOs create an external confidential reporting system so that NGDO employees may report suspicious actions anonymously without the requirement of reporting to your supervisor or the “chain of command.”

Demonstrating and confirming in writing that an applicant for public finance is able to comply with CTM are now part and parcel of USAID’s procedures and a formal requirement for Australian Aid (AusAid). Given that many NGDOs are often highly dependent on tax-based funding, investing in compliance is a necessity if annual budgets are to be maintained or increased. But the (proportional) costs of doing so may be prohibitive for small or financially weak organisations. For example, U.S. auditing rules are far more onerous than other donor countries. This condition limits the numbers and type of NGDOs able to access US money primarily to the larger U.S. based international NGDOs. It also leads to higher than internationally acceptable overheads, being paid to the U.S. international NGDOs. But such generosity is not passed onto partners, which makes it both unfair and more difficult for them to comply with legal requirements.

Know your partner +
Counter-terrorism legislation is creating a direct obligation on northern NGDOs, Foundations and similar funders to vouch for the probity of the recipients of their support in terms of eligibility and ultimate use of assistance. Some approaches to interpretation of CTM Laws also appear to require a funder to vouch for a partner’s partner or, even further, for the bona fides of the final recipient of benefits that funds produce. Some U.S. government agencies also now require a northern NGDO or Foundation to certify in writing that it has not only checked lists of terrorist organizations but also investigated the data available publicly about its grantees. An informal practice in the U.S. has begun to emerge whereby recipient NGDOs sign such a certification. Thereafter, the NGDO sends the donor agency a “hedge” letter in which the NGDO states that in signing the required certification, the NGDO has assumed the certification is properly interpreted with reasonable views of materiality and detail (i.e., “strict” compliance is unreasonable for a donor to seek). The hedge letter is intended to present some legal defence to any later criminal or civil sanction against the NGDO. Some such hedge letters apparently have been rejected by U.S. agency donors. As explained below, some NGDOs have declined funds rather than sign the required ‘certification.’

Follow the money both to and from your NGDO
To ensure that financial resources are not directly or indirectly deployed to support terrorists or their causes, new laws on international financial transfers are now being applied to NGDOs. In addition, previously existing laws or regulations defined and propagated by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money laundering are being more vigorously enforced. Originally establish to counter money laundering, in 2002 FATF’s mandate was extended to combat terrorism financing.

57 * Also suggested … is that charities be able to demonstrate they conducted a reasonable search of public information to determine whether a foreign recipient is or was implicated in any questionable activity, and verify the recipient organization wasn’t linked to money laundering or terrorism by government lists.” Nonprofits Fear False Accusations of Terror Grants, May 1, 2003, The NonProfit Times, by Jeff Jones. See also footnote 15.

58 An example certification “Acquisition and Assistance Policy Directive AAPD 04-07 of USAID requires, among others, that the recipient has not provided funds or material support to terrorists but also that it “will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not ...” and that it will “take into account its own knowledge and information that is public in making the [c]ertification.” See AAPD 04-07, page 3.

Government vigilance is also directed at Diaspora transfers of funds to people’s countries of origin. This includes refugees and other international migrants that are increasingly relied upon in economies of developed countries. “Globally, the value of remittances outweighs overall aid transfers by fifty percent” (Bakewell, 2004:16). In other words, the CTM agenda is not just about restrictions in relation to the misdirection of public funds allocated to international development, it is also about sources and channels for private international remittances and ‘informal’ banking systems.

Two other implications arise in the “follow the money” issue. First, the U.S. Laws apply to not only the transfer of money and also prohibit “material support” to terrorists or foreign terrorist organizations. These and related laws define support to include “lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses … communications equipment or other physical assets except medicine or religious materials” (InterAction, 2004). Second, U.S. and many other laws prohibit money laundering. This means that the NGDO must not only follow where it sends money, but also where it came from to ensure that money is not being ‘laundered’ through it (US Government, 2002; OECD, 2002).

Administrative measures
Alongside these public and overt measures, there are preliminary indications of subtler and less transparent ways in which counter-terrorism strategies are being pursued by governments. In the case of aid, by and large, governments are seldom challenged legally about the way public funds are allocated to NGDOs. There are two reasons for this.

First, processes and procedures for aid allocation rely on policies established within a government agency and interpreted in relation to the political position and preferences of the regime in power. As long as there is ‘due process,’ compliance with applicable law and administrative transparency in fund allocation, any regime has the right to establish how it will prioritise what it does with public money. Consequently, a choice can easily be made to tighten procedures and requirements, for example, by demanding more information and to apply more stringent risk assessments. After the events of the last few years, it is easily argued by a government agency that the public demands and expects such requirements.

A second reason why decisions about fund re-allocation, for example towards failed or weak states, may not be challenged is because northern NGDOs seldom want to “rock the boat” or seem to be too difficult or too demanding. NGDOs that do take issue with such moves are often financed from other (private) sources, which can deepen schisms and the power of a united front. However, in the final analysis, aid allocations are a judgment and not an exact science. Consequently, though seldom publicly expressed, there is a fear that open complaint by an NGDO about how a bureaucracy alters its rules may work against that organisation in the longer term. Thus, self-censorship can result in grudging compliance. Obviously, the political realities of a country determine the degree to which this covert scenario plays out. But reluctant compliance and self-censorship by NGDOs must be recognized as a real part of ‘doing business’ that may be reinforced by a more competitive funding environment.

Organisational implications: burdens and risks

Laws and procedural changes require much greater diligence by NGDOs. Examples are: staff educational programs on the Laws, background checks on employees, internal notification systems and confidential procedures for reporting suspicious transactions, manual or electronic review of lists of ‘blocked’ organizations, use of “red flag” checklists to identify potentially dangerous grantees, more complex grant agreements and procedures,

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60 See 18 United States Code §§2339A and B.
reduction or elimination of cash transfers in favour of international correspondent banks, and certification by the recipient NGDO confirming proper fund use.

The costs involved in compliance are likely to be added to organisational overheads. This will place additional strain on an already contested (comparative) measure of NGDO efficiency. And, it is far from clear that donors will allow their funds to be used to satisfy CTM requirements. As noted above, unlike other donors, the U.S. has accepted very high overhead levels due to auditing compliance requirements. The danger for non-U.S. NGDOs is that their respective countries adopt CTM but are not be willing or able to accept the extra costs required for conforming to what the law requires.

Violation of the Laws has serious consequences. In the U.S., organizations and individuals associated with the organizations that make improper financial transfers are subject to both criminal and civil penalties. Additionally, charities have the risk of losing their charitable and tax-exempt status. It is vital that governing bodies are aware of their new or additional responsibilities and penalties for not getting it right.

A normal organisational response to increased threats and uncertainties is to reduce risk. Examples of NGDO concerns that demand updated risk management policies and strategies are illustrated in a recent article in The NonProfit Times:

- “Even if charities follow the guidelines they don’t receive a safe harbour like the financial industry receives when filing reports;
- International field offices that investigate banking practices and family relationships of staff and board members they work with could jeopardize field workers’ safety;
- Muslim charity donors are concerned that they could be held accountable if a specific program to which they give is later linked to terrorism;
- The guidelines could somehow become de facto measures for what constitutes good grant making or management practices and become part of future legislation.”

There are various approaches to risk reduction. Selection of partners and programmes, discussed below, is one of the most obvious. But making significant effort and investment in order to fully comply with legal and administrative requirements can also reduce risk. Another possibility is for a governing body to revisit and redefine their risk tolerance levels and risk management strategies and communicate them publicly to show both awareness and openness that improves public image and funders’ confidence.

In sum, although the cases of diversion of nonprofit funds to terrorism may be few and far between, the precautionary and preventive intensions of counter terrorism measures mean that all CSOs have to comply.

6. DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY: NGDO POLITICAL-ECONOMY, STRATEGY AND PRACTICE

Potentially more demanding than technical compliance are issues that arise from shifts in the political-economy of NGDOs associated with a development for security agenda. The previous poverty-alleviation objective of aid tilted the balance in an NGDO’s political economy equation towards economic imperatives of fundraising, growth and institutional sustainability. Abetted by a harmony and partnership model of social change, the implied civicness of NGDO-ism was recognised but could be subsumed in generally apolitical interpretations of service provisioning, empowerment as voice and choice, capacity-building,

62 The NonProfit Times, May 1, 2003 by Jeff Jones.
resource transfer, partner selection, knowledge generation, advocacy as a technical matter for specialists, etc. A demand for professionalised NGDOs was fed by changes in aid architecture pivoting around agreements at UN conferences, MDG targeting, sector wide approaches in aid delivery, privatization of public services, decentralised public administration and panoply of associated supposedly participatory planning and other mechanisms to produce measureable results (Fowler, 2005; Herz and Ibrahim, 2005).

Often tied to a country’s commitment to aid financing or dependency on its availability, these parameters created an evolutionary bias towards NGDOs as deliverers of public services rather than mobilizers of civic forces that are argued to be essential for democratic transformation and consolidation. In sum, for most NGDOs it made economic sense to become technically competent in provisioning and risk-reducing political sense to stick with the soft mechanisms rather than the contentious essence of democratization from below. This latter task became the realm of social movements, trade unions and other, more rooted, forms of civil society as protagonists and enactors of change, many of whom regard NGDOs as non-civic and compromised in their ability to be transformatory.63

Against this background, a development for security framework implies adjustment in the parameters affecting trade-offs in the political-economy equation an NGDO employs. This probability is currently reinforced by the behaviour of America – supported amongst others by Germany and Japan. The USA is trying to alter the final declaration of the UN Millennium +5 Summit is ways that remove references to MDGs and reorient the UN debate towards security.64 The following paragraphs therefore review what a move in the external parameters of the NGDO political-economy might mean. The focus is on three areas where tricky trade-offs are involved and insightful decisions need to be made. The areas are related to institutional positioning, which is intimately tied to macro resourcing; relationships within and beyond the aid system; and development strategy and programming choices.

Positioning

An NGDO’s identity and position within civil society is initially determined by constituency base, ideology or issue, expressed as a vision and a mission or calling. These factors are formed at a particular historical moment. Over time, shifts in context and resource opportunities, proportions and conditions exert leverage on interpretation of the original initiating factors to better align them with funders’ priorities. Derivatively, identity becomes co-determined by the type of development projects or programmes financed and the choices made within the relationships available. This pragmatic rather than principled evolution often gives rise to slippage and inconsistency between espoused mission and actual practice. Position in word is not reflected by position in deed. When contextual change is slow or modest this discrepancy can continue to exist. However this is frequently at the cost of efficiency and effectiveness because of heightened ‘partnership’ transaction costs as an NGDO’s intention to be consistent with its own agenda is traded-off with what donors want to finance. However, when external conditions and demands shift more substantively, inconsistency can become seriously dysfunctional, requiring a deep reflection on what the organisation really believes in, stands for and why.

This research report argues that development for security is a contextual change of an order that merits NGDOs to review not just positioning but more profound aspects of themselves. Development for security is unambiguously intended to operationalise aid to better serve security needs within the geo-politics of the donor world that are intricately linked with their geo-economic interests, world view and domestic anxieties. Consequently, NGDOs’ own

63 See reports of debates within World Social Forums.
64 See web site and publications of the Global Campaign Against Poverty, communication on 28th August 2005 <www.whiteband.org>
analysis must determine if their calling conforms to this function of development cooperation and how. Hard questions for self-reflection would be: for our organisation, whose security counts most and why is it under threat? What forces are involved? What and who is driving them? Where do we stand? Are we, as NGDOs of the South or of the North and under benign guise, essentially agents of a primacy of Western security? With these and similar critical questions answered, two further factors in positioning can be tackled: resources and relationships.

Resources
Increasingly, the justification for official aid will be explained to tax payers in security terms. Consequently, while NGDOs may be able to negotiate flexibility in the stringency of conditions, there is every likelihood that the official finance they access will be progressively informed by security considerations. This perspective will push NGDOs to make a conscious choice about the extent to which they want to align with and be co-defined by priorities set in a DfS agenda, or actively opt for alternative sources of income in order to retain some distance, independence and autonomous voice, although even this possibility may be under threat (Oldendahl, 2004).

NGDOs that are not willing to accept CTM related conditions because of what they mean or might imply for limiting expression or relationships, or because of possible legal consequences, face the prospect of shrinking budgets. For example:

“The American Civil Liberties Union has rejected $1.15 million from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, rather than accept restrictions intended to prevent grant funds awarded by the foundations to be used to underwrite terrorism or other unacceptable activities, the New York Times reports. Anthony D. Romero, ACLU executive director, said the language of the contracts governing the grants was broad and ambiguous, leaving them open to interpretation that could impede free speech and limit advocacy work not only at his organization but also at other nonprofits.”

Governing bodies of NGDOs are usually averse to declining budgets and the above example may be an unusual step. But it is an option that NGDOs may have to consider. One approach to this option – seldom applied - would be to ask southern partners if they have any problem with conditions under which funds destined for them are to be made available. Taking this step would imply having the courage to turn down ‘back donor’ funding if counterparts object to the terms involved.

In addition, because of the virtually unchallengeable use of proscribed lists, an NGDO may suddenly find its assets frozen because of security ‘doubts’ about a recipient. Even worse and as likely, shifts in politics can engender official harassment, which is intended to distract and absorb organisational energy in refuting false charges and deal with interruptions in operations. Being branded a ‘supporter of terrorism’ or the ‘servant of a foreign master’ are common threatening epithets. Reasonable fears may also include loss of tax exempt status, as well as civil and criminal sanctions against directors/officers/trustees. Deregistration of NGDOs on spurious grounds is not an uncommon way for governments to deal with critics. CTM can provide even more grounds for such unfounded behaviour.

Where the proportional costs of compliance are too high, some NGDOs may simply have to pack up. Inexplicable losses in funding from prior northern partners may also lead to the shrinking and fading away of southern NGDOs.

66 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some large NGDOs believe that the practice of buying and using computer programs to check the lists of ‘blocked’ persons or organizations soon will move from a convenience to a being required by best practices.
The general and critical point is that irrespective of source of income, NGDOs are subject to CTM demands. Consequently, the way in which their identity is reshaped will probably depend less on technical compliance and more on if and how they engage with the state-failure dimensions of development for security both in supply and demand side roles. Here strategic choices and what flows from them in terms of relationships and development programmes become central.

**Relationships**

A possible effect of DfS on NGDOs could be greater relational caution. Risk reduction would suggest greater stringency in terms of partner choice, with escalating demands for information and less inclination to give the 'benefit of the doubt' when there are reporting problems or gaps. How will a northern NGDO now make decisions about local partners? What is the effect on the smaller, newer, or emerging southern CSOs such as nascent social movements seeking a partnership with a northern counterpart that is wary of CTM implications? How can a southern CSO prove its bona fides, when a northern NGDO is looking for track record, established board membership, international banking connection or other evidence of financial transparency?

In addition to self-imposed constraints, there are the government lists to worry about. Is a counterpart or (potentially) collaborating organization, or its members / employees / officers / directors on a proscribed list somewhere? Listings may often block the possibility of a relationship, even when government funds are not involved. The Laws prohibit the transfer of funds or material support regardless of its origin. Similarly, and to reduce their own risk of civil or criminal penalty, some northern NGDOs have asked southern NGDOs for certification of its local partners. A further invidious feature of CTM is that it is seldom possible to prove a negative. For example, other than nothing being found, can a southern NGDO actually 'demonstrate' that it has no links to or sympathy with an entity on one of the terrorist lists?

For good or ill, there is little doubt that development for security will impact on NGDO relationships and preferred ways of working together.

**Development Strategy**

Creating a development strategy to reduce poverty has always involved dilemmas and trade-offs. These problems will continue but with added complications. A prudent approach to strategy for NGDOs is to assume that development for security signals a fundamental shift in official thinking about the function of aid with long-term horizons. While bureaucracies may move ponderously slowly, aid is being allocated a task in what appears to be inexorable processes intended to ensure that insecurity does not negatively effect global trade and commerce, threaten Western supremacy and reduce government protection of citizens, albeit at the cost of their basic freedoms (Sidel, 2004). If this is the case, whether recipients of official aid or not, NGDOs would do well to revisit past assumptions as well as moral and other trade-offs that have informed strategy until now.

Useful reflection could be applied to: dilemmas between service delivery and substantively redressing root causes of weak statehood; an over emphasis on advocacy as a demand-side role; the problem of sequencing in enhancing public capacity and institutions to exercise control over the building of a stronger state; tensions inherent between service provisioning and solidarity; and the merits of and moments for choosing development through contention instead of partnership.

NGDO development strategies reflect a variety of supply and demand functions described in section 4. A development for security paradigm sharpens a strategic conundrum for NGDOs and donors where the prevention of insecurity through more and better service delivery can run counter to addressing the causes of state failure. Improved public services can act as an
analgesic, ameliorating discontents which often underlie the civic mobilization and activism called for in substantive democratization. Strategically, what needs to be done so that one does not undermine the other under different country conditions?

Criteria applied to Table 1 further suggests that development for security expands the terrain and alters the necessary proportions of investment of developmental capital on the supply side to demand-side investments in citizen-driven governance reform in terms of voice, political engagement and exercise of rights. Such re-proportioning raises a potential challenge to policy advocacy as a dominant demand side contribution of NGDOs. This method is unlikely to be an effective means for structural reform benefiting the poor unless it stems from and is allied to meaningful civic action. This is not to imply that pro-poor policy reform though lobbying and argument cannot produce gains. The issue is that evidence-based approaches (Court, Hovland and Young, 2005) have a limitation and a potential draw back. The limitation is that policy advocacy is unlikely to touch the heart of the issue – a conflictual but ultimately stability-enhancing democratization of power – unless aligned with adequate civic energy and expression. The potential drawback, is that professionalisation of advocacy may weaken, deflect or displace ordinary citizens as protagonists for change and enactors of state building. Civically understood, DIS is a rights-oriented, structural pro-citizen shift in state-society relations. Policy reform is typically a catalytic entry point to the technocracy that merits revisiting as a major NGDO demand-side strategy.

Strategic emphasis on democratization in substance rather than form brings greater voice, contestation and more critical demands on political behaviour. Such processes can be readily viewed as destabilising and responded to with greater constraining ‘effectiveness’ as a failed, fragile or weak state is made ‘coercively’ stronger in the war against terrorism. Where do NGDOs locate themselves within this paradox or, perhaps, sequencing problem? Can ‘better’ coercive force be democratically controlled or constrained if the precondition of a robust democracy is not satisfied in the first place? Is this, therefore, where NGDOs should strategically orient themselves? That is collaborate with broader civic forces that seek to alter power distribution and the political dispensation so that one malign regime is not replaced with another – the how of real democratisation?

Partnership is now the predominant approach to achieving development of aid recipients. It is a cautionary, sovereignty-sensitive relational approach with little historical grounding in the experience of developed countries. The general NGDO adoption of this stance is allied to years of increased reliance on official aid. The evolution of partnership and tax-based finance has generally led to ambiguity in NGDO institutional positioning within the struggle against poverty and people’s enjoyment of their rights. On the one hand, many NGDOs serve as a delivery mechanism for official aid, conforming with its priorities and ideas about how societies change, essentially through amoral market-led processes. On the other hand, NGDOs espouse moral imperatives, solidarity and identification with the life world of people who are poor where market penetration, such as privatization of essential services, may actually worsen their situation and therefore merit active civic resistance. A strategic shaking between the two hands often involves a narrative dexterity rather than translation into consistent practical action. Maintenance of this type of ambiguity is made possible in part because NGDOs are typically silent about the ‘theory of change’ they subscribe to. Development for security invites, if not demands, clarity about how NGDOs see the forces and processes that lead to structural poverty reduction and meaningful democratization in their setting(s) and historical moment. Strategic choices and practical programmes would then be informed by these perspectives.

The following figure is an illustrative model of the parameters that would inform NGDO decisions about positioning and strategy within development for security framework.

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67 Hence, for example, the UN initiative for ethical globalization (see Clark, 2003).
Programme and projects translate the choices made within this model into operational action. Here NGDOs face opportunities and complications.

Development programmes: factors in design

Determining what practical contribution to make within development for security requires decisions about programmatic content and process. Critical features involved in a security orientation in programme design can be identified: integration; an emphasis on connections and linkages; transforming prevent into cure; and processes required for an appropriate how of democratization. Implications for the functions and roles of NGDOs and reflections on their divisions between north and south are beyond the scope of this report and will feature in subsequent analysis.

Content integration
The eight dimensions of development for security – with all the components contained in reaching a ranking - provide a rich array of possibilities for NGDOs to strengthen and expand their development repertoire and carefully craft country specific programmes. Each indicator within each domain corresponds to a potential development initiative and activity. However, insecurity and the potential for conflict and terrorism have multiple drivers and complicated relationships between socio-political structure and individual agency. Consequently, a highly segmented or narrow diagnosis of cause, effect and possible remedy is likely to be ineffective. Correspondingly, allied to a theory of change, programming needs to be based on comprehensive insights about the relative weight or significance of each dimension of potential or actual insecurity within specific country conditions. This foundation will help identify existing linkages between components and how they need to be altered. In other words, such insights are required to determine the mix of content required from other CSOs and NGDOs individually and collectively.

Linkages and connections
A second distinguishing feature of programming within a development for security framework will be the importance of fostering two types of links and connections. First, will be the connections required for collective civic action. A variety of perspectives are available to explore the forces and dimensions involved (e.g., Olson, 1971; Tarrow, 1998; Krishna 2002; Prakash and Selle, 2004). By and large, NGDOs have not demonstrated a substantial track record in linking participants across their own projects, let alone across other initiatives in ways that non-violently assert shared civic demands. Often based on a common issue or
livelihood, alignment of civic energy can be better advanced through widespread and networked rather than fragmented approaches.

A second area meriting connective effort in programme design is between a number of NGDOs in order to create integrated content. There are two positive reasons for this, as well as potential drawbacks. In favour of connected approaches is the fact that NGDOs that ‘do everything’ are more inclined towards large size, reduced agility and greater attention to upward rather than the downward accountability required from democracy within civil society, not just of the state. Conversely, connectivity between NGDOs requires coordination and potentially higher transactions costs. A further positive consideration is tied to vulnerability. Individual NGDOs that are densely linked locally with a common agenda and connected internationally enjoy a quality of support that can act as a safety screen when conditions associated with creating a robust democracy become tough. Obviously, protection from an official backlash is far from guaranteed. But, a multi-actor, combined basis of programming to operationalise development for security can reduce hazard and vulnerability.

**Turning prevention into cure**

Can the potentially preventive effects of NGDO service delivery on insecurity be transformed into ways of addressing reasons for state weakness? Is it possible to design service-based programmes such that state responsibility is not displaced onto the poor through promotion of self-management, self-financing and similar strategies. This challenge has been around for a long time. But widespread adoption of solutions that turn supply-side development investment into demand-side capability become even more urgent if state frailty is to be addressed at its root causes rather than circumvented by NGDO compensatory affects.

**Process and risks**

But, perhaps the most complex and vexing programmatic issue that NGDOs will face is one of building robust democracy. This is particularly the case if, as previous evidence suggests, the ‘how’ of process is important with civil society playing a crucial role of non-violent protagonist not simply a partner. Again, the reflection of the philosopher Isaiah Berlin is pertinent: there is no well-defined boundary between critical civic action and insurrection. Contestation and its resolution tests and moves this border case-by-case, country-by-country. Development for security calls for careful programmatic refinement founded on a sound awareness of NGDOs of the ‘politics of being apolitical’ in a non-partisan sense.

In working to redefine and shift the boundary between criticism and insurrection risk stands central, especially given the power asymmetry between northern and southern NGDOs. Supporting southern NGDOs on the front line of change from the comfort of northern locations is fraught with moral difficulties. In programme design, these issues must be honestly faced and put on the table in discussions about funding and other forms of support. Northern NGDOs could usefully look towards their roles as insurers, relational brokers and lenders of first resort.

7. DEVELOPMENT FOR SECURITY AND NGDOs: FOUR PROPOSITIONS

As a form of conclusion, the wide-ranging appraisal provided so far can be summarised in terms of critical propositions about NGDOs in a future era of development for security.

**Proposition 1:** Development for security creates the opportunity for change to be seen and treated as a civic-centred process.

The political economy of international development has progressively incorporated non-state actors, but with governments retaining primacy as the focus of necessary change. However, a security agenda directed towards substantive and robust democratization requires
processes centred more towards citizens than government or market. There is now an opening and necessity for NGDOs to be proactive in formulating and articulating what civic energised, centred and driven development would look like, not as a peripheral ‘beyond-participation’ technique but as the core of what security enhancement is all about.

**Proposition 2: Development for security requires NGDOs to reassess the extent to which a partnership or harmony model of change is appropriate and effective.**

Historical evidence suggests that NGDOs need to deliberately review conditions under which mobilization and contention are more appropriate than harmony and negotiation in attaining structural change benefiting people who are marginalised and otherwise disadvantaged. Put another way, citizens may be partners, receivers and claimants but they are also protagonists and enactors whose energy and drive are important forces that also have to be strategically supported and tactically deployed. NGDOs need both a guide and a capability to accurately determine which approach – and combinations thereof – is most suited to what development processes at what moments.

**Proposition 3: Development for Security will require NGDOs to place risk at the centre of thinking about their governance, strategic analysis, relationships and practices.**

Increasingly, risk features in four areas of importance to NGDOs. First, global economic integration is redistributing livelihood risks faced by different groups across the world. From this perspective, a primary development task of NGDOs is to ensure that re-division of risk is away from and not towards those already vulnerable and least able to cope. A second type of risk is associated with the (inter)national politics of applying the label ‘terrorist’ and what such uncertainty means in terms of where to work and where existing relationships suddenly become illegal. The third area of risk involves establishing and maintaining adequate compliance with counter-terrorism laws and procedures to ensure that no criminal liability befalls governors or staff or others by association. Fourth, embarking on state-building or strengthening as protagonist as well as partner invites greater risk of regime discomfort and backlash that needs to be carefully assessed. Its possible consequences must be openly negotiated and fairly distributed between northern and southern NGDOs. Dealing with this type of risk is both a moral and equity issue. In sum, risk – its assessment and management – is a feature to explicitly factor into NGDO thinking and practice.

**Proposition 4: Development for security requires NGDOs to be clearer about themselves.**

Development for security changes drivers of aid from the hope of poverty reduction to the anxiety of insecurity. This is a very different motivational framework that may not resonate with NGDO cultures. Such a framework also implies a shift in language, rules and conditions based on a more political theory of change that serves some interests more than others. What the power play and geopolitics of official aid designates as the justification, content and process of development cooperation in a security era may or may not accord with an NGDO’s own thinking and preferred practices. Aligning with the less powerful may have implications for funding, scrutiny by security services, new types of vulnerability as well as opportunities. Whatever the case, without a well considered reflection on officially-defined development NGDOs will be hampered in determining what is appropriate in terms of their stance, functions, roles and relations to power at home and abroad.
References and Readings


